By Amb. Sidikie Elvis Fornah
Sierra Leone has witnessed an important and highly consequential moment in its constitutional and parliamentary history following Parliament’s conclusion of its consideration and voting on the Constitution of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Bill, 2025.
The process has generated intense national discussion, particularly around the parliamentary voting procedure and the constitutional threshold required when Parliament considers a Bill intended to alter the Constitution. At the centre of the debate are two provisions of the 1991 Constitution: section 91(1) and section 108(2)(b).
The Speaker’s position has been associated with section 91(1), while the Opposition has relied principally on section 108(2)(b) in maintaining that the constitutional amendment process requires the two-thirds threshold prescribed by the Constitution.
This article does not seek to determine which side is legally correct. Nor should it be understood as suggesting that Parliament, the Speaker, the Government, the Opposition or any individual has acted unlawfully. Rather, it seeks to examine the constitutional questions that have emerged and to reflect on why the interpretation of these provisions is important to Sierra Leone’s constitutional democracy. As the nation patiently awaits authoritative judicial interpretation, the central question remains: At what stage does the special two-thirds constitutional requirement become applicable during Parliament’s consideration of a Bill seeking to alter the Constitution?
Understanding Section 91(1): The General Rule of Parliamentary Voting
Section 91(1) of the 1991 Constitution provides the general rule governing voting in Parliament. It states: “Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, any question proposed for decision in Parliament shall be determined by a majority of the votes of the Members present and voting.”
The words “except as otherwise provided in this Constitution” are particularly important. They establish that the ordinary majority rule is not necessarily applicable to every question that comes before Parliament. Where another constitutional provision creates a different voting requirement, that special constitutional provision must be considered alongside section 91(1).
This is where the present constitutional debate becomes interesting. The argument associated with the Speaker’s position is that Parliament, during the relevant stages of consideration before the constitutionally prescribed second and third readings, is dealing with questions within the ordinary parliamentary process. On that approach, section 91(1) provides the general voting rule unless and until a specific constitutional provision requires otherwise.
This interpretation gives significance to the words “except as otherwise provided.” The question, however, is whether section 108(2)(b) provides that exception only at the second and third readings, or whether its constitutional character should affect substantive votes on the proposed amendments during the Committee stage as well. That is the difficult question.
Section 108(2)(b): The Special Constitutional Threshold
Section 108 deals specifically with the alteration of the Constitution. Section 108(2)(b) provides that a Bill for an Act of Parliament under the constitutional amendment procedure shall not be passed unless: “the Bill is supported on the second and third readings by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the Members of Parliament.” The language is considerably different from section 91(1).
Section 91(1) speaks generally of a majority of Members present and voting. Section 108(2)(b), on the other hand, specifically refers to not less than two-thirds of the Members of Parliament at the second and third readings. This distinction is at the heart of the present controversy. It is therefore understandable why the Opposition has relied on section 108(2)(b) in questioning whether the constitutional amendment process can proceed through substantive decisions based upon an ordinary majority. But there is another equally important question: Does section 108(2)(b) require the two-thirds threshold for every vote taken during the entire parliamentary consideration of the Bill, or does the wording deliberately attach that threshold to the second and third readings?. The answer to that question is not something that should be determined merely by political argument. It is ultimately a matter of constitutional interpretation.
The Speaker’s Reliance on Section 91(1)
The Speaker’s position, as publicly reported, was that during the Committee stage Parliament could determine individual provisions by the ordinary parliamentary voting procedure rather than applying the two-thirds requirement to every individual question.
This position has a textual basis that deserves to be examined carefully. Section 108(2)(b) does not simply say that every vote concerning a constitutional amendment must receive two-thirds support. Instead, it expressly identifies the second and third readings. That wording cannot simply be ignored.
Parliament’s Standing Orders also provide for the Committee stage as part of the ordinary process through which Bills are examined clause by clause before the third reading. The Standing Orders describe the Committee stage as involving consideration of clauses, schedules and proposed amendments, followed subsequently by the third-reading stage. Consequently, one possible interpretation is that the Constitution intentionally distinguishes between:
1. consideration and decision-making during the Committee stage, and
2. the constitutional threshold required when the Bill reaches the second and third readings.
On this interpretation, section 91(1) governs questions during the ordinary stages of parliamentary consideration, while section 108(2)(b) imposes the special constitutional threshold at the stages expressly identified by the Constitution. That is a plausible textual argument. But it is not necessarily the only argument.
The Opposition’s Reliance on Section 108(2)(b)
The Opposition has approached the matter from a different constitutional perspective. Its argument, in substance, is that Parliament was not considering an ordinary Bill. It was considering a Bill whose very purpose was to alter the Constitution. Therefore, according to this position, the special constitutional safeguards associated with constitutional amendment should not be treated as something that becomes relevant only at the final moment of the parliamentary process.
The concern is particularly understandable where individual votes during the Committee stage determine whether particular constitutional provisions are retained, removed or altered. If a provision intended to amend the Constitution can be conclusively determined by a simple majority during Committee stage, while the final Bill is subsequently subjected to a two-thirds threshold at second and third readings, an important constitutional question arises: What happens if the substantive constitutional choices have already been made before the two-thirds threshold becomes applicable?
That is the question that gives the Opposition’s argument constitutional weight. The Opposition’s position does not necessarily mean that every vote in Parliament must automatically receive two-thirds support. Rather, the argument raises the issue of whether substantive decisions that directly determine the content of constitutional alteration should themselves be subject to the constitutional safeguard. That distinction is important.
Where Does the Attorney-General’s Earlier Position Fit?
From the beginning of the constitutional amendment process, the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, Hon. Alpha Sesay, defended the Government’s approach to the Bill and its constitutional procedure. The significance of the Attorney-General’s position is that the constitutional procedure was not an issue that suddenly appeared on the final voting day. Questions concerning the legal route for the Bill had been part of the national discussion throughout the legislative process.
There have also been public questions concerning the preliminary requirements for constitutional amendment, including the publication requirements under section 108(2)(a). For example, parliamentary concerns were publicly raised earlier in the process about whether the requirements concerning publication in the Gazette had been properly observed. This demonstrates an important point: A constitutional amendment Bill is not governed by the same procedural framework as an ordinary Bill.
The Constitution itself establishes a special route for constitutional alteration. The Attorney-General’s position therefore deserves to be considered within the broader constitutional structure rather than only through the political controversy surrounding the final vote.
The Greater Difference Between an Ordinary Bill and a Constitutional Amendment Bill
This may be the most important part of the entire debate. An ordinary Bill is principally designed to create, amend or repeal ordinary statutory law. A constitutional amendment Bill, by contrast, seeks to alter the supreme legal framework under which Parliament, the Executive, the Judiciary and other institutions exercise their powers.
That difference explains why the Constitution imposes additional safeguards. Under the ordinary legislative framework, Parliament generally proceeds through the established stages of first reading, second reading, Committee consideration and third reading, followed by the processes leading to presidential assent and publication. The Standing Orders expressly set out this legislative sequence.
A constitutional amendment Bill is different because section 108 introduces additional constitutional requirements. For example, section 108(2)(a) provides publication requirements before such a Bill is introduced, while section 108(2)(b) requires support of not less than two-thirds of Members of Parliament at the second and third readings. Certain entrenched provisions also attract further constitutional requirements, including a referendum.
Therefore, it would be a mistake to treat a constitutional amendment Bill as merely another ordinary Bill with a different title. It is a Bill operating within a special constitutional architecture.
Why the Phrase “Two-Thirds of the Members of Parliament” Matters
Another important issue deserving careful attention is the wording of section 108(2)(b). The provision refers to: “not less than two-thirds of the Members of Parliament.” This wording is materially different from section 91(1), which refers to: “a majority of the votes of the Members present and voting.”
These are not identical formulations. Section 91(1) focuses on those present and voting. Section 108(2)(b) speaks of Members of Parliament. That difference explains why the two provisions have become the centre of such significant constitutional debate.
But even here, caution is necessary. The precise mathematical and procedural application of the constitutional threshold should be determined by the authoritative interpretation of the Constitution and the relevant parliamentary record, rather than by political commentary alone.
The Committee Stage: The Real Constitutional Battleground
The present dispute appears to have crystallised around the Committee stage. Parliament’s Standing Orders provide for Bills to be examined clause by clause during Committee stage. The constitutional question is therefore not simply: “Does section 108 require two-thirds?” That proposition is already expressly contained in section 108(2)(b) for the second and third readings.
The harder question is: “Does section 108(2)(b) also control substantive votes taken during the Committee stage, notwithstanding its express reference to the second and third readings?” This is where statutory and constitutional interpretation becomes necessary. One approach emphasizes the literal wording of section 108(2)(b): if the Constitution expressly says second and third readings, the courts should be cautious about inserting an additional stage that the text does not expressly mention.
The other approach emphasizes the purpose and protective character of constitutional amendment procedures: if Parliament can determine the substance of constitutional amendments through simple-majority votes before reaching the second and third readings, the supermajority safeguard might arguably be weakened in practical operation. These competing approaches deserve serious legal consideration.
Why the Supreme Court’s Interpretation Matters
As Sierra Leone waits for the constitutional question to receive authoritative judicial interpretation, the most constructive approach is patience. The purpose of judicial interpretation is not to determine which political party has won a parliamentary argument. It is to determine what the Constitution means.
The Supreme Court, when properly seized of a constitutional question, is institutionally positioned to examine the text, context, structure and constitutional purpose of the relevant provisions. The question may therefore ultimately require consideration of:
The exact wording of section 91(1);
The exact wording of section 108(2)(b);
The relationship between the two provisions;
The constitutional significance of the Committee stage;
The meaning of “second and third readings”;
The structure of Parliament’s Standing Orders;
The constitutional distinction between ordinary legislation and constitutional alteration; and
The broader purpose of constitutional safeguards.
It would be premature for political commentators to declare the final legal answer before that interpretive process has been completed.
We Should Not Turn a Constitutional Question into a Political War
The present disagreement should not be reduced simply to: SLPP versus APC. That would make the debate smaller than it really is. The Constitution belongs to the people of Sierra Leone. Today, one political party may be in government. Tomorrow, another may be in government. A constitutional procedure accepted today may be relied upon by a completely different political administration in the future.
Therefore, every political party should be careful about establishing constitutional practices merely because they favour its immediate political position. The real question should always be: What interpretation best protects the constitutional order of Sierra Leone regardless of which political party holds power? That is the standard by which constitutional questions should ultimately be measured.
The conclusion of parliamentary voting does not necessarily conclude the constitutional conversation. Instead, it may mark the beginning of a deeper national discussion about how Sierra Leone understands constitutional amendment.
We should therefore resist the temptation to make definitive legal declarations while important constitutional questions remain subject to interpretation. The Speaker has relied on section 91(1). The Opposition has relied on section 108(2)(b). The Government and its legal advisers have maintained their position throughout the legislative process.
The courts, where properly called upon, will have the opportunity to consider the constitutional question within the limits of their jurisdiction. Until then, citizens should approach the matter with patience and respect for constitutional institutions.
As Sierra Leone patiently awaits authoritative clarification, perhaps the greatest lesson from this episode is that constitutional democracy is not only about the power to change the Constitution; it is equally about respecting the constitutional rules governing how that change may be made. The Constitution must remain bigger than the Government. It must remain bigger than the Opposition. It must remain bigger than the Speaker. It must remain bigger than Parliament itself. Because the Constitution belongs to the Republic and ultimately, to the people of Sierra Leone.
