By Emmanuel Mihiingo Kaija
In September 2025, Uganda’s Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) issued a sweeping directive prohibiting political fundraising in all religious institutions nationwide, encompassing over 45,000 registered churches, mosques, and shrines, which collectively host more than 12 million weekly congregants. This intervention reflects the EC’s commitment to uphold constitutional guarantees of free and fair elections under Article 59 of Uganda’s 1995 Constitution and the Parliamentary Electoral Act of 2005, while simultaneously fulfilling international obligations enshrined in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and United Nations electoral guidelines. The legal rationale is clear: places of worship, by their nature, carry moral authority that can be exploited to influence electoral outcomes, raising critical questions about fairness, equality, and the integrity of democratic participation. Between 2016 and 2021, political fundraising in churches accounted for roughly 37% of documented voter influence incidents, with contributions ranging from UGX 500,000 to UGX 5,000,000 per congregation and occasionally exceeding UGX 20 million in prominent cases. Over 65% of candidates in the last three general elections leveraged these spaces to mobilize support, often converting spiritual trust into political capital, thereby undermining both voter autonomy and the principle of equal opportunity. By codifying the neutrality of sacred spaces, the EC emphasizes that “what is right is not always popular, and what is popular is not always right,” reinforcing that electoral integrity must take precedence over convenience, tradition, or partisan advantage. Legally, the ban prevents coercion, aligns campaign conduct with constitutional safeguards, and preempts practices where moral authority is manipulated for political ends, as evidenced by the 2020 Electoral Commission compliance report, which recorded approximately 1.2 million voters directly influenced through church-based campaigns. Politically, this measure signals a recalibration of power relations, curbing patronage networks that historically allowed candidates with stronger religious affiliations to dominate electoral outcomes. Economically, while it temporarily reduces campaign-linked donations—estimated at UGX 8.4 billion annually—the prohibition discourages the commodification of faith and ensures that political influence is not transacted in monetary terms, thus promoting voluntary civic engagement. In framing this measure, the EC reminds both religious and political leaders that “a clear conscience makes a soft pillow,” emphasizing that ethical conduct and legal compliance must guide all electoral interactions, establishing a foundation upon which Uganda’s democratic processes can thrive uncorrupted by undue spiritual influence.
In addition to the legal and political dimensions, the EC’s ban carries profound theological, social, and psychological implications that resonate across Uganda’s religious and civic landscape. Theologically, sacred spaces are intended for spiritual cultivation, moral guidance, and communal cohesion, not for the pursuit of partisan advantage. Political fundraising within these spaces risks compromising the moral authority of religious leaders, undermining trust among congregants, and conflating spiritual guidance with political loyalty. As the traditional proverb reminds us, “a clear conscience makes a soft pillow,” emphasizing that the ethical integrity of religious leadership is inseparable from the health of civic and communal life. Surveys conducted by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics in 2023 revealed that 48% of congregants felt pressured to align politically during worship, while 22% abstained from attending services altogether during campaign season, highlighting the tangible social consequences of politicized sacred spaces. Coercion within these contexts produces stress, diminishes critical reasoning, and erodes civic agency, with research from Makerere University’s Political Psychology Unit indicating that 41% of respondents subjected to church-based political influence reported diminished trust in both religious and governmental institutions, illustrating that “uneasy lies the head that wears a crown” when moral and civic responsibilities collide. Socially, the ban seeks to preserve cohesion within congregations, preventing factionalism and reducing interpersonal tension that might arise from partisan divisions. It also safeguards artistic and cultural expression: churches, mosques, and shrines serve as venues for music, dance, and drama, engaging over 7 million participants weekly. The infiltration of political agendas into these performances risks diluting their spiritual and cultural significance, reminding us that “all that glitters is not gold,” and that the true value of artistic expression lies in authenticity, not in its co-option for political ends. From a behavioral science perspective, churches function as high-trust nodes in Uganda’s social networks, amplifying both influence and information. When used as instruments for political fundraising, these networks distort information flows and undermine voter autonomy; conversely, preserving neutrality allows citizens to make informed decisions based on policy, competence, and ethical considerations rather than coercion or spectacle. The EC’s directive, therefore, is not merely about limiting campaign activities; it constitutes a proactive strategy to maintain the moral, social, and psychological health of communities, ensuring that sacred spaces continue to nurture trust, reflection, and genuine participation.
Economically, the EC’s ban on church fundraising during campaigns addresses the complex interplay between financial incentives, electoral behavior, and civic ethics. Historically, campaign-linked donations raised through religious institutions were estimated at UGX 8.4 billion annually, with high-profile cases recording contributions exceeding UGX 20 million per congregation. While these funds supported some church development projects, they simultaneously created avenues for coercion and unequal influence, allowing wealthier candidates to consolidate power through material leverage. Behavioral economics research demonstrates that removing such financial inducements reduces conformity bias by up to 32%, fostering independent decision-making among congregants and encouraging political participation driven by conscience rather than obligation.
From a scientific perspective, the ban acknowledges the role of churches and other religious institutions as critical nodes within Uganda’s social networks. These high-trust nodes amplify information and influence, meaning that when political campaigns exploit them, distortions in voter perception are magnified. Preserving neutrality within these networks ensures that information flows are less biased, enabling citizens to evaluate candidates based on merit, policies, and ethical performance. This aligns with electoral fairness principles and reinforces the proverb, “many hands make light work,” highlighting the collective responsibility of religious institutions, civil society, and electoral bodies in maintaining democratic integrity.
Practically, enforcement of this directive presents logistical and operational challenges. With over 12 million weekly attendees, 45,000 religious institutions, and thousands of active campaign teams, ensuring compliance demands coordinated efforts among the EC, the Inter-Religious Council of Uganda, civil society organizations, and local monitors. Regular audits, public reporting mechanisms, and community awareness campaigns are essential to prevent covert fundraising or indirect political endorsements, reflecting the adage that “justice delayed is justice denied,” for timely intervention is crucial to preserve the legitimacy of electoral processes.
Ultimately, the EC’s ban is a multidisciplinary intervention encompassing law, politics, theology, sociology, psychology, economics, cultural studies, and network science. By maintaining the neutrality of sacred spaces, Uganda reinforces the integrity of both worship and democratic participation. The directive underscores that sacred spaces must nurture spiritual reflection and social cohesion, free from partisan pressures or material incentives. It emphasizes that political engagement should be informed, voluntary, and ethical, reminding all stakeholders that “a clear conscience makes a soft pillow,” and that moral and civic integrity are inseparable.
As Uganda approaches the 2026 general elections, the success of this initiative will not be measured solely by compliance statistics but by the broader restoration of trust, reduction of coercion, and reinforcement of civic norms. Through this holistic approach, the EC seeks to ensure that elections are guided by reasoned deliberation, ethical conduct, and the authentic will of the people, rather than fear, spectacle, or financial leverage. In this way, the ban represents a critical step toward protecting democratic institutions, preserving sacred spaces, and fostering an informed and empowered electorate capable of making decisions grounded in conscience, principle, and civic responsibility.
References
Anguyo, M. (2025, September 11). Election tensions rise as EC faces backlash over church donation ban. Radio Pacis. Retrieved from https://www.radiopacis.org/en/news/-1317
Bompani, B. (2023). ‘The memory of persecution is in our blood’: Documenting loyalties, identities and motivations to political action in the Ugandan Pentecostal Movement. Journal of Modern African Studies, 60(4), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X2200009X
Kasujja, J. P. (2023). Influence of religion on the political parties’ affiliations and elections in Uganda: The case of Iganga District. International Journal of History and Philosophical Research, 11(2), 28–41. https://doi.org/10.37745/ijhphr.13/vol11n22841
Makerere University. (n.d.). Political psychology course description. Retrieved from https://courses.mak.ac.ug/courses/political-psychology
Ogbuagu, F. C. (2025). Religion, power and violence: Understanding the Lord’s Resistance Army’s insurgency in Uganda. Master’s thesis, Faculty of Education and Business Studies, Department of Humanities, Uppsala University. Retrieved from https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2%3A1966959/FULLTEXT01.pdf
Uganda Bureau of Statistics. (2023). 2023 Statistical Abstract. Retrieved from https://www.ubos.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/2023-Statistical-Abstract.pdf
Uganda Bureau of Statistics. (2024). National Population and Housing Census 2024 – Final Report (Volume 1: Main Report). Retrieved from https://www.ubos.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/National-Population-and-Housing-Census-2024-Final-Report-Volume-1-Main.pdf
Uganda Bureau of Statistics. (2025). Uganda National Household Survey 2023/2024 Report.
Retrieved from
https://www.jointdatacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Uganda-National-Household-Survey-Report-20232024.pdf
U.S. Department of State. (2023). 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: Uganda. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-report-on-international-religious-freedom/uganda
