By Mahmud Tim Kargbo
Joseph Postell’s call for “radical reforms to conserve Congress” resonates far beyond the Potomac. Read from Freetown, his themes, curbing over-centralisation, re-anchoring legislators to constituencies, and building broad, durable coalitions, mirror long-standing prescriptions from our own constitutional order, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), and the Audit Service Sierra Leone (ASSL).
This essay restates Postell’s central claims and reimagines them for Sierra Leone: what would it mean, in practice, to conserve and revitalise our Parliament? I argue that the Constitution already furnishes the architecture; that the TRC’s cautionary history supplies the moral imperative; and that the audit trail, from Ebola through COVID-19, offers a practical roadmap of what to fix and how.
What Our Constitution Already Requires
Our basic law is unambiguous about first principles. As Section 73(1) affirms: “The legislative power of Sierra Leone is vested in Parliament.” (1991 Constitution, p.21, http://www.unesco.org/education/edurights/media/docs/4d1f1a5d5f4c6b97a1f9e80b9690c1a4c5a.pdf).
Equally plain is Parliament’s non-delegable duty to control public finance. Section 119(2) provides that “The public accounts of Sierra Leone and of all public offices… shall be audited and reported on by the Auditor-General…” (p.130, same URL).
And our drafters anticipated the dangers of partisan capture. Section 77(k) ties an MP’s seat to party membership, a blunt instrument that has too often reduced constituency representation to party discipline: an MP “shall vacate his seat… if he ceases to be a member of the political party of which he was a member at the time of his election…” (pp.32–33, same URL).
The TRC’s Charge Sheet: How We Got Here
The TRC captured, with clinical economy, what happens when Parliament succumbs to Executive overreach: “Parliament was reduced to a ‘rubber stamp’ and the judiciary was subordinated.” (TRC Report, Vol. 2, Ch. 3, p.179, http://www.sierraleonetrc.org/files/reports/Volume%202.%20Chapter%203%20-%20Sierra%20Leone%20Conflict.pdf).
The Commission’s remedy, rebuild oversight, insist on fiscal probity, and humanise emergency powers, remains the clearest Sierra Leonean gloss on Postell’s and Wallach’s shared instincts. It also foretold the governance stresses that later audits would expose.
Koroma Era (2007 to 2018): Laws and the Lesson of Ebola
President Ernest Bai Koroma’s governments shepherded a series of institutional statutes that today underwrite parliamentary control:
Right to Access Information Act, 2013 (http://www.extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/sie152528.pdf)
Audit Service Act, 2014 (http://www.auditservice.gov.sl)
Public Financial Management Act, 2016 (http://www.extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/sie158181.pdf)
Yet the crucible was Ebola. The ASSL’s special audit of May to October 2014 documented systemic control failures, insufficient documentation, payroll leakages and non-compliance, precisely the pathologies that robust, parliament-policed public finance management should prevent (Audit of the Management of the Ebola Funds, 2015, http://www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/assl-report-on-ebola-funds-management-may-oct-2014.pdf).
The legislative scaffolding mattered. The 2016 PFM Act codified medium-term budgeting, commitment control and sanctions, giving the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) clearer statutory teeth. But as Ebola revealed, laws are only as effective as Parliament’s willingness to enforce them.
Bio Era (2018 to ): Stronger Laws, Sharper Strains
President Julius Maada Bio’s administrations advanced further governance reforms:
Anti-Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2019 (http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=112870)
Repeal of Criminal and Seditious Libel, 2020 (http://www.parliament.gov.sl/dnn5/Portals/0/Hansard/THURSDAY%2016TH%20JULY,%202020.pdf)
Cybersecurity and Cyber-crime Act, 2021 (http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=112869)
Public Elections Act, 2022 (http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=116845)
The stress test came with COVID-19. The ASSL’s audit of NaCOVERC (March to June 2020) concluded that emergency regulations “have had no bearing on the management of the Response funds as at 30th June 2020” (p.21, http://www.website.auditservice.gov.sl/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Report-on-the-Audit-of-Funds-managed-by-NaCOVERC-and-other-MDAs.-March-June-2020-1.pdf).
One emblematic procurement involved 30 motorbikes for the ONS at Le651,060,000. ASSL found the unit price “was exceptionally expensive”, estimating a Le276,060,000 loss, with no NRA-approved GST invoice, and the bikes not produced for physical verification (p.25, same URL).
PAC responded with four days of televised hearings (Jan to Feb 2021) and a verification mission. Yet just months later, on 11 November 2021, the President suspended the Auditor-General pending a tribunal, an act that chilled the audit cycle and weakened parliamentary oversight (Reuters, 12 Nov 2021, http://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sierra-leone-president-suspends-state-auditor-pending-probe-2021-11-11/).
“Secret Parliament” in Sierra Leone?
Postell’s and Wallach’s critique of a “Secret Congress”, where the real work occurs away from cameras, has resonance in Sierra Leone. PAC’s technical sittings, buried in annexes and schedules, rarely trend on WhatsApp yet shape recoveries, surcharges, and compliance.
But secrecy is dangerous. As the TRC warned, whenever Parliament’s glare softens, emergency powers harden, and accountability decays.
Would Weakening Party Discipline Strengthen Parliament?
Here Section 77(k) bites. Party expulsion equals loss of seat. Designed to stabilise fragile coalitions, the rule too often prioritises party whip over constituency voice. If MPs are to pursue “politically cross-cutting policies rather than partisan loyalty” (Postell), Sierra Leone must revisit this constitutional straitjacket. Representation must be tethered to the people, not the party register.
Concrete Reforms for a Sierra Leonean Renaissance
Repeal or Narrow Section 77(k): Replace automatic seat loss with recall-by-constituents, administered by the Electoral Commission.
Audit Timetable Act: Impose statutory deadlines from audit tabling to PAC hearings to Government response, modelled on UK Treasury Minutes.
Standing Orders Upgrade: Codify televised PAC hearings and require on-site verification for high-value procurements.
Procurement Red Flags: Mandate automatic Anti-Corruption Commission review where ASSL identifies inflated prices.
Shield the Auditor-General: Any suspension must be time-limited, PAC-endorsed, and incapable of blocking report tabling.
Constituency Service: Adjust MP–constituent ratios to strengthen accountability without ballooning payroll.
Budget-Linked Transparency: Condition final quarterly warrants on full disclosure of contracts and implementation data.
Parallel Case Studies: Koroma vs Bio
Koroma (Ebola, 2014 to 2015): Unsupported payments and payroll anomalies; PAC hearings compelled evidence and set recovery precedents.
Bio (COVID-19, 2020to 2021): Documentation gaps, inflated allowances, and overpriced motorbikes; PAC hearings gave teeth, but the Auditor-General’s suspension weakened the oversight chain.
Lesson: Institutions matter only when Parliament insists on using them.
Postell’s American prescription, more cross-cutting coalitions and less partisan servitude, fits Sierra Leone’s diagnosis. But ours is not a blank slate. The Constitution already vests power in Parliament; the TRC already warned what happens when it abdicates; and the audit record already shows where we leak value and how Parliament, when it chooses, can staunch the loss.
The radicalism we need is restorative: free MPs from Section 77(k)’s leash; force the audit, PAC, House and Executive cycle onto a statutory timetable; and embed emergency spending in transparent, verified routines. Do that, and Parliament will again be what Section 73(1) declares it to be, the sovereign forum of the people.