By Emmanuel Mihiingo Kaija
In moments of national or global crisis—be it a pandemic, economic collapse, natural disaster, or security threat—the resilience and legitimacy of democratic institutions are tested. Among these institutions, parliaments are expected to act as the guardian of public trust, a forum for debate, and a mechanism to hold the executive accountable. Yet, crises often expose the limitations of parliamentary oversight. While robust laws and constitutional provisions exist to empower legislatures, history and contemporary events suggest that legal frameworks alone are insufficient to ensure effective scrutiny.
Parliamentary oversight, in its essence, is the systematic review and monitoring of government policies, actions, and expenditures. Oversight mechanisms typically include hearings, committee investigations, budget reviews, and motions of no confidence. In theory, these tools are codified in constitutions, standing orders, and specialized legislation, providing a clear framework for accountability. Yet, crises demand rapid action, and the law’s pace often cannot match the speed of unfolding emergencies. During the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, parliaments worldwide struggled to maintain oversight as executive powers expanded, emergency decrees multiplied, and resources were reallocated without routine scrutiny. In several African nations, parliamentary committees either met irregularly or were bypassed entirely, leaving citizens dependent on executive transparency and goodwill. The legal framework, although robust on paper, failed to guarantee substantive oversight in real time.
The question then arises: what does effective oversight require beyond the law? Three dimensions emerge clearly from comparative experience: capacity, independence, and culture. First, parliamentary capacity encompasses both human and institutional resources. Oversight demands expertise in finance, health, security, and other sectors, alongside sufficient staff to analyze complex policy decisions. Many parliaments in crisis-affected states operate with skeletal research teams and overburdened members, creating structural weaknesses that no law can correct. Second, independence is crucial. Legal provisions often grant powers to summon officials or access classified information, but these powers are only meaningful if members are politically insulated from executive pressure. Where political party dominance or patronage compromises independence, oversight becomes ceremonial rather than substantive. Third, culture and norms within the legislature determine whether oversight is proactive or reactive. In some parliamentary systems, committees function as extensions of the executive rather than as instruments of scrutiny; in others, adversarial approaches are discouraged, and dissent is politically costly. Legal instruments cannot cultivate a culture of vigilance, transparency, or courage—they can merely permit it.
Case studies illustrate these limitations vividly. In the 2008 global financial crisis, legislatures in several countries had the legal authority to interrogate banking bailouts, yet most deferred to central banks and executives, fearing political repercussions or technical inadequacy. Similarly, during the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, parliaments possessed emergency oversight laws but were sidelined as rapid public health responses demanded immediate executive action. Conversely, in nations where oversight culture was strong, such as Germany or South Korea, parliaments were able to provide real-time scrutiny, influence policy, and maintain public trust. This contrast highlights a critical insight: laws establish the possibility of oversight, but institutions, norms, and practice determine its effectiveness.
Moreover, crises often require parliament to balance two competing imperatives: enabling swift executive action and preserving democratic accountability. Excessive rigidity can hinder timely interventions, while laxity may erode transparency and foster corruption. Legislative frameworks that permit emergency decrees, fast-track budgeting, or provisional regulations must therefore be paired with sunset clauses, reporting requirements, and independent audits. These complementary mechanisms convert formal legal authority into operational oversight, ensuring that emergency powers do not become instruments of permanent executive aggrandizement.
Finally, the public dimension of oversight cannot be understated. Modern crises unfold under intense public scrutiny, amplified by digital media, civil society networks, and global institutions. Parliaments that engage openly with citizens, communicate rationale and findings, and respond to evidence-driven advocacy enhance both legitimacy and compliance. Laws alone, however well-crafted, do not automatically secure public trust; oversight must be visible, participatory, and responsive.
In conclusion, parliamentary oversight during crises is a multidimensional challenge. Legal frameworks provide the scaffolding for accountability, but they are insufficient on their own. Effective oversight depends on institutional capacity, political independence, cultural norms, and citizen engagement. Law sets the rules of the game, but it is the practice, ethos, and preparedness of parliamentarians that ultimately determine whether governance remains transparent, accountable, and resilient when society faces its greatest tests. To rely solely on legislation is to mistake potential for performance. As African proverb reminds us: “A spear does not kill until it is wielded by a hand that strikes true.” Laws grant the spear; oversight requires the hand.
References
1. OECD (2020). Parliamentary Oversight and Crisis Management: Lessons from COVID-19. OECD Publishing.
2. UNDP (2015). Legislatures in Crisis Response: Comparative Perspectives. United Nations Development Programme.
3. World Bank (2018). Strengthening Parliamentary Capacity for Fiscal Oversight. Washington, D.C.
4. Banda, F. (2019). Legislatures and Emergencies in Africa: Challenges of Oversight. African Journal of Political Science, 24(2), 45–67.
5. Kjaer, A. (2020). Accountability in Times of Crisis. Cambridge University Press.
