The Limits Of Presidential Power In Sierra Leone: What Our Founders Intended And What We’ve Become 

 

By Mahmud Tim Kargbo

The 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone, modelled in part on the United States Constitution, was designed to prevent authoritarianism, foster the separation of powers, and protect civil liberties. However, over the past two decades, especially under the presidencies of Ernest Bai Koroma and Julius Maada Bio, the balance of power has shifted significantly. Despite constitutional safeguards, the presidency now operates not only with energy but also with impunity.

I. COMPARATIVE LEGAL REASONING: FROM

SEILA LAW

TO

SAM-SUMANA

In the United States, the case of Seila Law v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (2020) raised important questions regarding the scope of executive authority. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the president could unilaterally dismiss the head of an independent agency. While some viewed this as a reaffirmation of presidential control over the executive branch, others criticised it as a departure from the framers’ vision of restrained governance.

A parallel moment occurred in Sierra Leone with Sam-Sumana v. Attorney General & Others (2015). President Koroma unilaterally dismissed his elected Vice President, citing a loss of confidence. The Supreme Court upheld this move, controversially interpreting Sections 41 and 51 of the 1991 Constitution to permit the removal of a vice president on grounds not explicitly outlined. The Court asserted that the Vice President’s loss of party membership rendered him disqualified, thus legitimising executive overreach.

[Case File: http://www.sierra-leone.org/Sam-Sumana-v-AG-2015.pdf]

This judgement set a dangerous precedent. While Seila Law was debated within a framework of institutional design and historical reflection, Sierra Leone’s Supreme Court offered no such rigour. The lack of constitutional or jurisprudential depth in the ruling weakened judicial independence and eroded the vice presidency as a constitutional office.

Further episodes, such as the 2021 suspension and later removal of Auditor-General Lara Taylor-Pearce and her deputy, Tamba Momoh, exposed continued judicial reticence. Legal challenges were filed, yet the courts remained silent or inactive, often when the judiciary itself appeared to be under executive pressure.

[See coverage: https://www.thesierraleonetelegraph.com/legal-battle-looms-over-suspension-of-auditor-general/]

II. THE TRC’S WARNINGS IGNORED: EXECUTIVE DOMINANCE AND DEMOCRATIC RETROGRESSION

The 2004 Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Report left no ambiguity regarding the causes of Sierra Leone’s civil war. It identified the centralisation of executive power, endemic corruption, and institutional collapse as key drivers. The report recommended the depoliticisation of the civil service, strengthened legislative oversight, judicial independence, and the professionalisation of the security sector.

Yet successive administrations have disregarded these prescriptions:

Executive Impunity: The TRC advocated for accountability in public office. Instead, both Koroma and Bio weaponised commissions of inquiry. Koroma never institutionalised anti-corruption efforts. Bio’s 2018 Commissions of Inquiry largely targeted members of the All People’s Congress (APC), raising doubts over impartiality and due process.

[TRC Report, Vol. 2, ch. 3, pp. 12–15: http://www.sierraleonetrc.org/index.php/view-report-text-vol-2/item/volume-two-chapter-three]

Civil Service Politicisation: The TRC stressed the need for a neutral bureaucracy. However, under both governments, civil service appointments became overtly political. Under Bio, for instance, key technocrats and permanent secretaries were redeployed or dismissed on the basis of perceived political affiliations.

[TRC Report, Vol. 2, ch. 2, p. 28: http://www.sierraleonetrc.org/index.php/view-report-text-vol-2/item/volume-two-chapter-two]

Security Sector Abuses: The TRC identified the politicisation of the military and police as a root cause of conflict. Nonetheless, incidents such as the 2020 Makeni protests and the August 2022 demonstrations were met with excessive force, mass arrests, and subsequent denial of fair trial rights.

[TRC Report, Vol. 3A, ch. 2, p. 42: http://www.sierraleonetrc.org/index.php/view-report-text-vol-3a/item/volume-three-a-chapter-two]

Electoral Integrity: The TRC urged reforms to bolster the independence of the Electoral Commission. However, the Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone (ECSL)’s handling of the 2023 elections, including its refusal to publish disaggregated results, undermined transparency. Neither administration has followed through on the TRC’s electoral reform agenda.

[TRC Report, Vol. 2, ch. 5, pp. 10–12: http://www.sierraleonetrc.org/index.php/view-report-text-vol-2/item/volume-two-chapter-five]

III. CIVIL SOCIETY AND INSTITUTIONAL RESISTANCE: A FRAGILE FRONTIER

Despite the executive’s dominance, certain institutions and civil society groups have mounted resistance, though not without facing significant consequences.

Audit Service Sierra Leone (ASSL): Both governments faced scrutiny from the ASSL, which consistently uncovered fiscal malpractice. However, the sudden suspension of Auditor-General Lara Taylor-Pearce and her deputy in 2021, immediately before the annual audit release, struck a serious blow to institutional independence. Ambiguities in the constitutional framework enabled the executive to act unilaterally.

Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone (HRCSL): Though mandated to monitor human rights violations, the HRCSL has remained underfunded and politically constrained. Reports on unlawful detention, police brutality, and protest suppression have rarely prompted reform.

[HRCSL Report on August 10 Protests, 2022: https://hrcsl.org/publications/august10-public-order-events-and-rights-violations]

Parliamentary Oversight Committees: Entrusted under Sections 93 and 129 of the Constitution to hold ministers accountable, these committees have largely failed to fulfil their mandate. The ruling party’s parliamentary majority since 2018 has neutered dissent, leading to ineffective oversight amid rising public debt and stalled reforms.

Civil Society Organisations and the Media: Groups such as the Institute for Governance Reform (IGR) and the Centre for Accountability and Rule of Law (CARL) have continued to publish independent analysis. However, they frequently encounter governmental hostility, restricted access to official data, and threats to their operations.

[IGR: https://igrsl.org/publications/; CARL: https://carl-sl.org/publications]

IV. PUBLIC SENTIMENT AND REGIONAL POLITICS: THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER

Public opinion surveys conducted by Afrobarometer (2022) and IGR (2023) highlight a paradox. While a majority of Sierra Leoneans profess support for democracy and the separation of powers, many condone executive overreach when it aligns with their ethnic or party loyalty.

Supporters in the southeast often defend President Bio’s actions as redress for perceived historical marginalisation under APC governments.

Conversely, many in the northwest still view Koroma’s administration as developmentally superior, despite evidence of systemic corruption.

This ethnoregional divide entrenches partisanship and stifles national consensus on constitutional governance. The presidency is increasingly seen as a zero sum prize rather than a national institution accountable to all citizens. Consequently, demands for reform are often filtered through partisan lenses, weakening civic unity.

[Afrobarometer: https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Sierra-Leone_R9_release_1_english_24nov22.pdf]

V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND REFORM: WHAT MUST BE DONE

To restore balance and uphold democratic norms, Sierra Leone must implement robust structural reforms:

Clarify Presidential Powers in Law

Amend the Constitution, particularly Chapter V and Sections 57–58, to limit discretionary removal of officeholders. Clear legal procedures should be established for removing the Vice President, Auditor-General, and heads of independent agencies.

[Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991: http://www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/constitution1991.pdf]

Reform the Judiciary

Establish an Independent Judicial Appointments Commission to promote merit-based, transparent selections. Judges must enjoy security of tenure to insulate them from executive influence.

Strengthen Parliamentary Oversight

Make ministerial attendance before oversight committees mandatory. Introduce annual self-assessments and public performance audits of Parliament.

Insulate Oversight Institutions

Introduce a Statutory Independence Charter for the ASSL, ECSL, Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), and HRCSL. These bodies should be directly accountable to Parliament rather than the Executive.

Institutionalise TRC Recommendations

Codify the TRC’s governance recommendations into law. An independent Office for Transitional Justice Implementation should monitor progress, free from partisan affiliation.

[TRC Report of Sierra Leone, 2004: http://www.sierraleonetrc.org]

Expand Civic Education and Protect the Press

Develop a national civic education curriculum to counteract political misinformation. Enact enforceable protections for journalists and guarantee public access to state information.

[Public Order Act reforms and media freedom reports (2020–2023): https://www.mfwa.org]

The presidency in Sierra Leone was never intended to be the supreme organ of state. It was to function as a servant of Parliament, executing laws and safeguarding the Constitution. Yet, through judicial complicity, institutional frailty, and political patronage, both Ernest Bai Koroma and Julius Maada Bio have transformed the office into a quasi monarchical seat of power.

To prevent the repetition of past failures and honour the sacrifices made to restore peace, the constitutional limits on presidential power must be not only reaffirmed but actively enforced. Otherwise, Sierra Leone risks perpetuating the very injustices that the TRC warned were the seeds of national collapse.

References:

Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991: http://www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/constitution1991.pdf

TRC Report of Sierra Leone, 2004: http://www.sierraleonetrc.org

Audit Service Sierra Leone Annual Reports: https://www.auditservice.gov.sl

Sam-Sumana v. AG & Others, Supreme Court of Sierra Leone (2015): http://www.sierra-leone.org/Sam-Sumana-v-AG-2015.pdf

Afrobarometer Survey (2022), Sierra Leone Country Data:

https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Sierra-Leone_R9_release_1_english_24nov22.pdf

Institute for Governance Reform Reports (2021–2023): https://igrsl.org/publications/

Centre for Accountability and Rule of Law (CARL): https://carl-sl.org/publications

HRCSL August 10 Report: https://hrcsl.org/publications/august10-public-order-events-and-rights-violations

ECSL Statements and 2023 Election Briefings: [see ECSL homepage: https://ecsl.gov.sl]

Public Order Act reforms and media freedom reports (2020–2023): https://www.mfwa.org