By Mahmud Tim Kargbo
In Sierra Leone, the lofty promise of the rule of law collapses under the weight of financial insolvency. While constitutions, commissions and reform strategies profess justice, equality and rights, they do so only on paper. When the state lacks the fiscal capacity to honour the legal obligations it enshrines, governance shifts from legality to improvisation. Rights become discretionary. The law becomes a matter of convenience.
This crisis is neither theoretical nor distant. It is historical, structural and acutely local.
I. LEGAL RIGHTS AS FISCAL LIABILITIES
As legal theorist Bruno Salama argues, every legal right, whether to property, health, pensions or justice, represents a financial obligation on the state. Upholding such rights demands transparent taxation, budgetary discipline and credible monetary management.
Sierra Leone’s 1991 Constitution affirms in Section 7(1)(b) that:
“The State shall harness all the natural resources of the nation to promote the welfare of the people and to protect the right of every citizen to gainful employment and social justice.”
http://www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/constitution1991.pdf
However, welfare cannot be promoted in the absence of public solvency. Legal and economic rights do not exist independently of budgetary commitment. Section 93(3) further requires Parliament to scrutinise public spending, a function that has too often been sidelined in practice.
II. TRC WARNINGS AND OUR FISCAL HISTORY
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), in Volume 2, Chapter 3, warned that one of the root causes of Sierra Leone’s civil war was the state’s chronic inability to deliver basic services and meet fiscal obligations. The report noted:
“Citizens lost faith in the rule of law because the state could not be relied upon to pay teachers, nurses, or police officers, nor to punish financial mismanagement.”
http://www.sierraleonetrc.org/index.php/view-report-text-vol-2/item/vol-two-chapter-three?category_id=14
The Commission made a direct connection between fiscal collapse and the erosion of legal authority. This is not an abstraction. In the years leading up to the 1991 civil war, the state routinely failed to pay salaries, triggering mass disillusionment and systemic decay.
The 1997 Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) coup offers a grim illustration. When financial systems were paralysed and public salaries suspended, courts ceased to function, property rights were abandoned and the law operated at the mercy of armed force.
III. CONTEMPORARY FISCAL LIMITS
Today, history echoes, not with the loud disruption of coups but in quiet, corrosive failures.
The 2023 Audit Service Sierra Leone report revealed that billions of leones in government expenditure remain unaccounted for. Persistent issues such as non-compliance with procurement regulations, off-budget spending and phantom employees plague several ministries.
http://www.auditservice.gov.sl/report/2023-audit-report/
These are not mere technical infractions. They represent constitutional breaches. Section 119 of the 1991 Constitution mandates that all public expenditure be audited and publicly reported. Failure to do so erodes both legal integrity and public confidence.
Additionally, inflation, driven by chronic deficits, unsustainable external borrowing and a weak domestic tax base, functions as an unlegislated tax. It silently devalues pensions, salaries and public contracts. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), in its 2024 Article IV Consultation Report, described Sierra Leone’s fiscal position as precarious. It warned that sustained instability could undermine both economic recovery and legal accountability.
http://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2024/321/article-A001-en.xml
IV. COMPARATIVE PARALLELS: ZIMBABWE, GHANA, LIBERIA
Sierra Leone is not unique in this dilemma, but the parallels are instructive.
Zimbabwe, under President Robert Mugabe, relied on hyperinflation and currency redenomination to meet obligations. The result was catastrophic. Property rights evaporated, savings were destroyed and the judiciary became largely ornamental.
Ghana, burdened by unsustainable debt in the early 2000s, entered the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and passed fiscal discipline laws. Its Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2018 and the creation of an independent Fiscal Council helped preserve economic and legal stability.
Liberia, following its civil conflict, tied its rule-of-law recovery to IMF-supervised fiscal reforms. Notably, its Cash Management Unit ensured daily treasury balances and protected judicial funding from executive interference. This is a model Sierra Leone could adapt within its Ministry of Finance.
By contrast, Sierra Leone shares many of Zimbabwe’s institutional weaknesses. These include over-centralised budget authority, underfunded accountability mechanisms and political interference in the audit process.
V. WHEN LEGAL FORMS REMAIN BUT MEANING DISSOLVES
The legal architecture still stands, but it is hollow.
Court judgments go unenforced. Contractual disputes drag on for years, not because of complexity, but due to the financial incapacity or unwillingness of government entities to pay. Civil servants endure months without salaries. Infrastructure contractors are paid with promises rather than funds.
Ordinary citizens, seeking justice, find that courts lack basic supplies such as fuel and stationery. Recruitment into public service remains suspended or politicised, not due to legal reform but because of budgetary ceilings.
As Bruno Salama aptly stated,
“Law continues to be cited, but no longer constrains. Its forms persist, but its substance erodes.”
VI. POLICY PROPOSALS: REBUILDING RULE THROUGH REVENUE
To reverse this descent, Sierra Leone must place fiscal integrity at the heart of governance. The following reforms are crucial.
Constitutional Fiscal Discipline Clause
Amend Section 119 to forbid unbudgeted expenditure and require that all supplementary spending be approved through a Fiscal Responsibility Bill passed by Parliament.
Independent Budget Monitoring Commission
Establish a non-partisan oversight body, independent of both Parliament and the Executive, similar to Ghana’s Fiscal Council, to audit all spending in real time.
Asset Disclosure and Penalty Framework
Mandate annual public asset declarations by all ministers, MPs and senior officials. Enforcement must fall under the Anti-Corruption Commission with penalties for non-compliance.
http://www.anticorruption.gov.sl
Mandatory Budget Hearings for Judicial and Oversight Institutions
Guarantee that the Judiciary, Audit Service and Anti-Corruption Commission receive constitutionally protected budget lines. This will ensure independence from executive funding pressure.
Transparent Inflation Reporting Mechanism
Require the Bank of Sierra Leone and Statistics Sierra Leone to release monthly, audit-verified inflation data to enable public scrutiny and policy responsiveness.
VII. THE MORAL IMPERATIVE: WHY THIS MATTERS
We cannot speak of human rights, property rights or democratic order when the institutions meant to uphold them are insolvent. Unenforced judgments, frozen pensions and devalued contracts are not technical lapses. They are moral failures.
The rule of law must be reconstructed from its fiscal foundations. As the TRC wisely noted,
“True justice begins with institutions that function, not just in theory but in the daily lives of people.”
In Sierra Leone, justice begins with a government that can afford to keep its promises.
References
Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991: http://www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/constitution1991.pdf
TRC Report, Vol. 2, Chapter 3: http://www.sierraleonetrc.org/index.php/view-report-text-vol-2/item/vol-two-chapter-three?category_id=14
Audit Service Report 2023: http://www.auditservice.gov.sl/report/2023-audit-report/
IMF Article IV Consultation Report 2024: http://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2024/321/article-A001-en.xml
Public Financial Management Reform Strategy 2023 to 2027: http://www.mof.gov.sl/pfm-reform-strategy
Anti-Corruption Commission Policy & Asset Declaration Law: http://www.anticorruption.gov.sl
