By Mahmud Tim Kargbo
Parliament in Sierra Leone has historically oscillated between fragile moments of assertion and sustained periods of executive domination. This essay argues that the institution’s recurrent decline reflects broader patterns of neopatrimonial governance, elite capture, and selective accountability. Through a historical analysis spanning independence to the present, and with case studies from the extractives and energy sectors, the essay demonstrates how parliamentary weakness has been reproduced across regimes. Drawing upon civil society reports, audit findings, and Afrobarometer surveys, it contends that Sierra Leone’s democracy is sustained more by periodic elections than by robust legislative oversight. The article concludes with policy recommendations to break the cycle of decadence, asserting that the future of accountability depends upon Parliament reclaiming its constitutional mandate.
The functioning of legislatures in postcolonial Africa has been marked by a recurrent tension between constitutional ideals and political realities. Sierra Leone epitomises this tension. While the 1991 Constitution.
(http://www.sierraleone.org/Laws/constitution1991.pdf) grants Parliament significant oversight powers including summoning ministers, scrutinising contracts, and investigating public expenditure, these powers have rarely been exercised independently. Instead, Parliament has often been subordinated to executive control, reflecting the enduring dominance of neopatrimonialism, where formal institutions coexist with informal networks of patronage and clientelism.
This essay contends that parliamentary decadence in Sierra Leone has been cyclical rather than linear. Each regime, from Sir Albert Margai through Julius Maada Bio, has promised reform yet ultimately reproduced patterns of subordination. Examining historical trajectories, mini-cases, and institutional dynamics, this paper situates Sierra Leone’s parliamentary crisis within broader theories of African governance while offering policy pathways toward institutional revitalisation.
Historical Foundations of Weakness
Albert Margai and the Seeds of Patronage
Following independence in 1961, Sir Milton Margai presided over a modest Parliament that largely respected constitutional boundaries. However, his successor, Sir Albert Margai, prioritised partisan consolidation, appointing allies through patronage and weakening the independence of the legislature. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) later traced these practices as early manifestations of executive dominance and clientelism (http://www.sierraleonetrc.org).
Siaka Stevens and the One Party State
Siaka Stevens entrenched authoritarianism by manipulating constitutional frameworks to abolish multiparty democracy. The 1978 one party constitution. (http://www.sierraleone.org/Laws/constitution1978.pdf) transformed Parliament into a rubber stamp. The TRC concluded that Stevens subordinated the judiciary, civil service, and legislature to his personal authority, normalising impunity and institutionalising a culture of deference to executive will.
The NPRC Coup and Institutional Suspension
In 1992, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) coup dismantled constitutional government, abolishing Parliament and ruling by decree (http://www.sierraleone.org/Other-Docs/NPRCdecrees.pdf). This further entrenched the belief that institutions were dispensable instruments of rulers rather than enduring checks on power.
Post War Reconstruction and the Illusion of Revival
Kabbah and the Return of Parliament
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah reinstated Parliament in the aftermath of civil war, introducing reforms such as the creation of the Anti Corruption Commission (ACC) in 2000 (http://www.anticorruption.gov.sl). Yet despite these measures, the TRC cautioned that parliamentary independence remained compromised by patronage networks. Parliament existed in form but not in substance.
The Sierra Leone Commercial Bank Hidden Debts
The Sierra Leone Commercial Bank scandal of the late 1990s and early 2000s exposed the hollowness of oversight. Audit Service reports (http://www.auditservice.gov.sl) highlighted politically connected loans and hidden liabilities, yet Parliament failed to hold either the Ministry of Finance or the Central Bank accountable. The episode symbolised continuity of elite protection even under democratic rule.
The Era of Koroma: Rhetoric without Accountability
Under Ernest Bai Koroma from 2007 to 2018, Parliament frequently aligned with executive priorities. Despite reformist language, Audit Service reports uncovered systemic procurement irregularities, unexplained withdrawals, and weak financial controls. Parliamentary committees routinely downplayed these findings, reflecting institutional subservience rather than oversight.
Ebola Funds Mismanagement
The Ebola epidemic of 2014 tested the system. Billions of leones were unaccounted for, as reported by the Audit Service.
(http://www.auditservice.gov.sl). Instead of demanding accountability, Parliament adopted a posture of silence, framing oversight as a threat to national unity. This episode illustrated how emergencies were used as rationales to justify opaque practices and suspend scrutiny.
Julius Maada Bio and the Big Five Game Changers
Bio assumed office pledging transparency through his New Direction manifesto and Big Five agenda (http://statehouse.gov.sl). Constitutional provisions empower Parliament to summon ministers and conduct inquiries, yet party discipline and executive dominance limited these powers.
The 2021 Mid Term Census
Parliament’s endorsement of the mid term census despite objections from statisticians, civil society, and international partners (http://www.statistics.sl) highlighted its tendency to validate executive positions regardless of technical or democratic concerns. The episode reaffirmed that parliamentary alignment with the executive often supersedes its duty of scrutiny.
Extractives and Energy: Governance Barometers
The extractives and energy sectors provide a clear lens for analysing parliamentary weakness. Here, elite enrichment has frequently come at the expense of national welfare, with Parliament failing to interrogate contracts or enforce accountability.
Mining Tax Exemptions
Christian Aid (2014) estimated Sierra Leone lost Le 966.6 billion or US$224 million in 2012 due to tax incentives.
(http://www.christianaid.org.uk/resources/our-work/losing-out-sierra-leones-massive-revenue-losses-from-tax-incentives). Civil society groups and international partners demanded inquiries, yet Parliament and the ACC remained silent.
National Minerals Agency Fee Non Collection
The Audit Service (http://www.auditservice.gov.sl) reported substantial uncollected licence fees, but no parliamentary hearings followed. Small traders were penalised while major corporations evaded payments worth millions, underscoring selective enforcement.
Controversial Energy Contracts
Contracts with Karpowership and Milele were awarded without open tender and at inflated costs (http://www.sierraleonetelegraph.com). Civil society branded them economic crimes, but Parliament refused scrutiny, reflecting the systematic shielding of politically connected actors.
The ACC and Selective Justice
The ACC was designed to complement parliamentary oversight. Yet, over time, it has been perceived as pursuing low level offenders while avoiding politically sensitive cases. The TRC warned that institutions risk becoming weapons in the hands of ruling elites (http://www.sierraleonetrc.org), a warning vindicated by the ACC’s pattern of selective enforcement.
Civil Society, Media, and Public Reaction
Civil society organisations including Christian Aid, Oxfam, the Campaign for Good Governance, and grassroots groups such as No to Secret Mining Deals have exposed malpractice and mobilised public campaigns (http://www.oxfam.org; http://www.cgghr.org). Independent outlets like the Sierra Leone Telegraph and Cocorioko have consistently critiqued extractives and energy deals as prioritising private gain over public welfare (http://www.sierraleonetelegraph.com).
Afrobarometer surveys underscore the consequences of institutional weakness: only 30 per cent of Sierra Leoneans believe corruption can be reported without retaliation, while 69 per cent fear reprisals (http://www.afrobarometer.org). MPs and tax officials are frequently perceived as corrupt, even as citizens continue to support electoral processes.
Explaining Cycles of Parliamentary Decadence
Several interrelated factors explain the persistence of this cycle:
Political patronage. MPs depend on executive largesse for political survival, eroding incentives for oversight (http://www.sierraleonetrc.org).
Institutional capture. The ACC avoids cases implicating elites, focusing on low level prosecutions (http://www.anticorruption.gov.sl).
Emergency rationales. Crises such as Ebola and energy shortages justify opaque governance (http://www.auditservice.gov.sl).
Weak enforcement. Parliamentary committees underutilise constitutional powers, rarely exercising investigative authority (http://www.sierraleone.org/Laws/constitution1991.pdf).
This constellation of factors sustains the cyclical decadence of Parliament, whereby moments of reformist rhetoric fail to translate into enduring institutional transformation.
Comparative Insights
The Sierra Leonean experience mirrors trends in other African states. In Ghana, parliamentary committees have occasionally asserted independence but remain constrained by executive control of resources. Nigeria’s legislature, despite formal powers, often succumbs to elite bargains. Liberia demonstrates similar patterns, where post war parliamentary revival coexists with persistent patronage. These comparative cases suggest that parliamentary weakness in Sierra Leone is part of a broader regional dynamic of neopatrimonial governance.
Policy Recommendations
Breaking the cycle of parliamentary decadence requires institutional reforms and cultural shifts.
Parliamentary Autonomy. Ensure budgetary independence to reduce reliance on executive patronage.
Mandatory Contract Publication. Require all extractive and energy contracts to be made public prior to approval.
Strengthening Committees. Empower and resource parliamentary committees to exercise investigative functions.
Reforming the ACC. Safeguard prosecutorial independence and insulate the Commission from executive interference.
Civic Engagement. Institutionalise mechanisms for civil society participation in parliamentary hearings.
International Partnerships. Condition donor support in extractives and energy on transparent parliamentary oversight.
The history of Sierra Leone’s Parliament reveals a recurring pattern of decadence shaped by executive overreach, patronage, and selective accountability. From Albert Margai’s early drift to Siaka Stevens’ authoritarian consolidation, from the NPRC’s decrees to Kabbah’s post war reconstruction, from Koroma’s rhetoric to Bio’s Big Five promises, Parliament has consistently failed to assert itself as a true guardian of accountability.
Extractives and energy deals illustrate the most striking failures, where silence has enabled elite enrichment at the nation’s expense. Yet the tools for correction exist: the Constitution, the ACC Act, the Audit Service, and parliamentary committees. Their activation, however, requires political will and civic insistence.
As the TRC cautioned, institutions that do not respect the people will not be respected. For Sierra Leone, the future of democracy depends upon breaking the cycle of parliamentary decadence and reclaiming Parliament’s role as the custodian of the public interest.